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America maintains arguably the greatest military capacity of any 
nation in the world. Yet this military might has proven unable to anticipate 
or defeat the insurgent conflicts that constitute the country’s longest and 
most costly wars. This portfolio identifies and tests a set of ‘tripwires’ for 
identifying nascent insurgencies. It then prescribes an analytic framework to 
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“an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a 
constituted government through the use of subversion and 
armed conflict.”  
(US Army Counterinteligence Field Manual) 
 
“an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to 
weaken the control and legitimacy of an established 
government, occupying power, or other political authority while 
increasing insurgent control.” 
(US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual) 
 
“the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nulify, 
or chalenge political control of a region.”  







The United States maintains arguably the greatest military capacity, in 
both the conventional warfare and counterinsurgency domains, of any nation 
in the world. It has fought epic conflicts with and among capable and 
determined world powers. It has waged, and won, war on multiple fronts, 
simultaneously. It has deployed military technology that forever altered the 
global balance and consequences of war. And yet, America’s 
counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, one it continues to fight today, has 
persisted longer than any war the US has fought before it, and appears no 
closer to resolution.  
It is no coincidence that the United States’ longest wars have been 
against insurgencies. The idiosyncrasies of insurgency make these conflicts 
biter, protracted, il-defined struggles of resolve. They are nuanced, localy 
and culturaly driven. Their asymmetric and unconventional strategies can, 
and have, brought seemingly invincible conventional armies to their knees. 
History may prove that insurgencies are inherently uncontestable.  
However, the nations that lose to insurgencies can usualy, in 
hindsight, trace the source of their failure, sometimes back to a single 
misguided strategic assumption which irrevocably doomed a 
counterinsurgency. Assumptions about the enemy, their environment, their 
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motivation, or their resolve are not easily or accurately sorted out in the heat 
of a rapid-onset counterinsurgency campaign. Most losers in these scenarios 
would likely identify rushed strategic decisions in the early stages of conflict 
as cause for their failures. 
With the perils of rushed decisions in mind, this portfolio proposes 
and tests a predictive framework designed to forecast insurgencies sooner 
and more accurately. It wil examine four common denominators, herein 
referred to as “tripwires”, within a sample of insurgencies of the last 60 
years: 1) institutional or government failure, 2) economic inequality or 
economic disruption, 3) underrepresented or persecuted ideologies, and 4) 
nonpermissive terrain or porous borders. These tripwires wil be explored 
within the existing insurgency literature, then tested against four notable 
insurgency case studies to assesses their reliability as insurgency precursors. 
Based on these findings, the paper wil prescribe an analytic 
framework to integrate insurgency stakeholders, streamline analysis, and 
codify decision points. This formalized process wil, idealy, improve both 
the accuracy and timeliness of predictive insurgency analysis across the 
national security enterprise, giving decisionmakers the benefit of strategic 
warning and preemption.  
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 To be clear, the four variables examined in this paper are not new to 
discussions of insurgency – historians, academics, and military strategists 
have debated these and a myriad of other variables for as long as 
insurgencies have been studied. This paper’s uniqueness lies in its 
examination of these variables specificaly as reliable first indicators of 
imminent insurgency. 
 The portfolio is also a distinctive atempt to merge the thoroughness 
and progressiveness of insurgency-related academic research with the utility 
of actionable defense-sector analysis. Academic research has a necessary 
role in national security analysis and decision-making, contributing a 
colective of objective expertise from outside the traditional stakeholder 
environment (which can be susceptible to groupthink and other pressures.) 
However, academic work, from stylistics to fundamental purpose, is 
often less suited for direct injection into national security decision-making – 
mainly because it is not intended to be. In this focused, fast-paced, and 
quasi-militarized environment, academia can appear generic and unfocused.1 
This segment of research and analysis requires a level of synthesis to be 
useful to policymakers.  
 
1 David Morgan-Owen, Approaching A Fork in the Road: Professional Education and Military Learning 
(Texas National Security Review, 2018) 
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Idealy, the prescribed framework wil condense academic findings 
into a concise and defined-but-adaptive format more readily accessible to the 
defense enterprise. This, with the aim of giving analysts, planners, 
strategists, and ultimately decisionmakers a new tool to beter anticipate, 




DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Variables 
This portfolio examines a sampling of 4 insurgency case studies of the 
last 60 years to establish if the variables (1. Institutional or Government 
Failures, 2. Economic Inequality or Economic Disruption, 3. 
Underrepresented or Persecuted Ideologies, and 4. Nonpermissive Terrain or 
Porous Borders) did or did not precede these insurgencies in their nascent 
states.  
In an effort to produce a flexible and widely applicable framework, 
and with the inherent uncertainty of strategic analysis in mind, these 
tripwires are presented without rigid definition. “Institutional or Government 
Failure,” for example, would look vastly different across conflict zones as 
systems of government and projection of centralized authority wil vary 
wildly. The same deviations could be expected when examining the 
remaining economic, ideological, and geographic tripwires. 
In this proposed framework, the satisfaction of each of the variables is 
left to the discretion of the analyst or analytic community examining it, as 
they are presumably armed with in-depth knowledge of their particular 
regions or analytic disciplines, and are best equipped to determine when a 
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variable is “tripped” in their area of responsibility. (This model is discussed 
further in the closing chapter of this portfolio.) 
Similarly, these tripwires are presented without prescribed weights 
within the framework, again in an atempt to produce a flexible analytic 
model. Whereas in one instance, the degrees of government failure and 
economic downturn may equaly affect the likelihood of insurgency, in 
another, the degree of government failure may be a drasticaly more 
determining factor, and therefore can be weighted more heavily in the 
overal framework. These determinations must be made on a case-by-case 
basis, by those wel versed in the nuances of the specific portfolios and 
regions under scrutiny. Again, this discretion is left to the analyst.  
Idealy, this high degree of discretion wil alow the framework to be 
applied to nascent conflicts widely while maintaining usefulness and 
accuracy.  
Case Study Selection 
The case studies examined were selected based on timeliness (within 
60 year scope) and intensity (at least bi-lateral combat operations exceeding 
a single atack or event which garnered international atention and resulted in 
batlefield casualties). Among the group of case studies which satisfied these 
two factors, the Afghan and Iraq insurgencies were chosen for their 
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timeliness, intensity, and relevance to US policymakers. The Sri Lankan and 
Colombian insurgencies were chosen at random from a list of global 
insurgencies compiled by researchers Ben Connable and Martin Libicki.2 
The data for this project was derived from academic, editorial, and 
















2 Ben Connable, Martin Libicki, How Insurgencies End (RAND, 2010) 
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TRIPWIRE 1: INSTITUTIONAL OR GOVERNMENT FAILURE  
“If the government fails to listen to your demands,  
     then you wil decide what is best for you.” 
 
– Muqtada al Sadr, Iraqi Shi’a Militia Leader 
 
Literature Review 
The majority of research consulted for this portfolio observes that an 
obvious catalyst for insurgency is government failure. Specificaly, the 
research explored below colectively points to 3 indicators of failure: 
1) security or defense lapse, 2) government transition, interruption, or 
colapse, and 3) constituent-perceived failure. Importantly, this discussion of 
“failure” wil include literature on observable government instability and 
security failure as wel as the role of perceived failure in fermenting 
violence. In the absence of observable failures, wide-spread public 
perception, quantified through census or poling data when possible, may be 
assigned greater weight within the framework, while acknowledging that 
this sentiment may be inconsistently or unobjectively measured. 
Gurr’s theory of “Relative Deprivation” holds that as the margin 
between what a populace expects and what it is granted widens, the 
perception of deprivation (usualy levied against the state) eventualy 
reaches a tipping point of hopelessness and violence.3 Acharya holds that 
 
3 Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton University Press, 1970) 
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those neglected populations wil be predisposed to insurgency because 
“rebelion is one of the few ways by which the politicaly…downtrodden 
respond to what they perceive as the injustices of state and society.” She 
points to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal as evidence.4 
As observed by US Army Special Operations Command, governments 
failing to provide competent security and justice for their populations are 
more susceptible to insurgency.5 Akhtar and Sultan expand that government 
effectiveness, rule of law, corruption, and government-led economic 
development are correlated with the vulnerability of insurgency, pointing to 
the Maoist uprising in India.6 
Paul, Clarke, Gril, and Dunigan assert strong evidentiary support for 
the degree to which government capacity informs violence. They noted that 
government actions that do not contribute to substantial new grievances 
while implementing reforms during an insurgent conflict positively correlate 
to a reduction in the duration of that conflict. In fact, of the 30 insurgencies 
examined via their study, the majority were in some part inspired or 
 
4 Avidit Acharya, The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal and the Political Economy of Violence (Woodrow Wilson 
School of Public and International Afairs, 2009) 
5 US Army Special Operations Command, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies 
(2013) 
6 Marium Akhtar; Beenish Sultan, “Insurgencies in South Asia: A Comparative Case Study of India’s 
Maoists and Pakistani Taliban” (Margalla Papers 2015) 
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instigated by perceived or actual institutional shortcomings.7 This can lead to 
what Kilculen refers to as “feral” populations, or subsets that naturaly 
devolve or deliberately become ungovernable.8 
Fearon and Laitin found that the likelihood of insurgency increased by 
67% in a given country when it experienced government instability 
(“transition” “interruption” or “colapse”) at any point within three 
preceding years. Functionaly, they hypothesize that financialy and 
structuraly weak central governments increase the likelihood of insurgency 
due to ineffective policing, poor power projection, and corrupt 
counterinsurgency efforts. 
On a similar functional level, Colier and Hoeffler argue (inversely) 
that exceedingly wel-funded governments may make rebelion “militarily 
infeasible.”9 Thus, financialy weak governments may be regarded as 
“militarily permissive.”  
Of note, neither Fearon and Laitin or Colier and Hoeffler find 
evidence that degree of national political grievance alone is a reliable 
predictor of insurgencies.10 Similarly, Acharya also notes that there is litle 
 
7 Colin Clarke, Christopher Paul, Beth Gril, Moly Dunigan, Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case 
Studies (RAND National Defense Research Institute 2013) 
8 David Kilculen, Out of the Mountains (Oxford University Press, 2013) 
9 Coler, Paul. Hoefler, Anke, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” (Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford 
University, 2004)  




quantitative evidence of a causal relationship between political grievance 
and the frequency of violence.11 The literature then seems to suggest that 
government instability and/or functional shortcomings in capacity and 
services are more reliable predictors than political grievance alone.  
To note a competing argument, Malevich and Youngman refute that 
government stability or strength is related to violent rebelion. They observe 
that reliance on government or centralized institutions is culturaly and often 
localy driven, citing the highly tribal and decentralized culture of 
Afghanistan, so argue that functional capacity cannot serve as a reliable 
indicator for insurgent violence.12 
 
Case Study Results 
Afghanistan – Preceded by Institutional and Government Failure  
Government Transition, Interruption, or Colapse  
In 1973, a successful coup overthrew Afghanistan’s King Zahir Shah 
and set the precedent for a patern of tumultuous overthrows and internal 
power struggles. In 1978, an opposition group mounted a successful coup 
against then-president Daoud. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded and 
 
11 Avidit Acharya, The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal and the Political Economy of Violence (Woodrow Wilson 
School of Public and International Afairs, 2009) 
12 John Makevich & Daryl Youngman, “The Afghan Balance of Power and the Culture of Jihad” (Military 
Review, May-June 2011) 
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occupied Afghanistan, seizing control over the central government and 
military until withdrawal in 1988. Simultaneously, the 1980’s saw the rise of 
the Mujahedeen insurgency and influx of al-Qaeda. The mid-1990’s saw the 
ascendance of the Taliban government. In total, this period (1973-1990s) 
saw at least 5 disruptions or transitions of power, and continuous chalenges 
to siting government.13 
In 2001, the U.S. led coalition quickly ousted the siting Taliban 
government. This colapse of the siting administration immediately 
preceded the onset of the insurgency, which vied to expel foreign military 
forces and re-establish the Taliban as the governing body.  
Security or Defense Failure 
 Notably, the aforementioned transitions of power were al affected by. 
violence. The 1973 coup against King Zahir Shah was enabled by Marxist 
army officers. In 1978, an opposition group mounted a coup against then-
president Daoud, kiling him, his family members, and supporters in the 
process.14 The siting governments during these transitions proved unable to 
defend their office via security services or the military, and in fact some 
forceful transitions were aided by the military.  
 




In addition, the Mujahedeen insurgency remained a persistent 
chalenge to central government through Soviet occupation and beyond, later 
morphing into the Taliban. These forceful overthrows and persistent 
domestic chalenges to siting governments highlight the ineffectiveness and 
disunity of the siting government’s security apparatus, and their inability to 
maintain domestic security. 
 These failures extended to defense from foreign threats. The 1979 
Soviet invasion underscored the military’s incapacity to defend its borders 
and sovereignty. The subsequent influx of 10,000 to 35,000 foreign 
Mujahedeen and Taliban recruits from neighboring Arab states represents an 
additional, uncontested foreign threat.15 The overwhelming US invasion in 
2001 further underscored Afghanistan’s security failures.  
Overal, this period demonstrated the inability of the siting 
government and existing institutions to maintain national security and 
provide for a common defense.  
  
 
15 Maria Donnely, Thomas Sanderson, Zack Felman, Foreign Fighters in History (Center for Strategic and 




Afghanistan’s institutions, which have always been fragile, were 
particularly anemic throughout and folowing the Cold War, which saw 
political and government institutions unable to project influence, authority, 
or services, particularly into rural areas. A general lack of cohesion among 
the public, paired with high population mobility, likely contributed to a 
populace disenfranchised from the central government.16 
Iraq - Preceded by Institutional and Government Failure  
Government Transition, Interruption, or Colapse  
In 1963, a military-led coup ousted Prime Minister Qasim and 
replaced him with Abd al-Salam Arif.17 In 1968, Ba’athists and military 
sympathizers, including Saddam Hussein, launched a successful coup 
against President Arif. In 1979, Hussein became president.18 The folowing 
24 years of Hussein’s tenure saw at least 7 coup and overthrow atempts.19 
In 1991, folowing a number of assassination and overthrow atempts 
and Iraq’s military failure in Kuwait, Kurdish rebels and Shias atacked 
 
16 Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban 
(University of Washington Press, 2001) 
17 US Department of State. Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy (US 
Department of State, 1963)  
18 Bruce Moon, “Long Time Coming: Prospects for Democracy in Iraq”, International Security, Vol 44, No 4, 
Spring, pp. 115-148 (MIT Press, 2009) 
19 Lisa Blaydes, “Military Service, Militias, and Coup Atempts”, In State of Repression: Iraq under Saddam 
Hussein. 266-304. (Princeton University Press, 2018)  
  
 15 
government targets in a nationwide insurgency. Hussein’s government 
would temporarily lose control of 14 of Iraq’s 18 provinces before queling 
the uprising.20 
Folowing the 2003 US-led invasion, with Hussein and many of his 
top officials in hiding, the Coalition Provisional Authority gradualy 
dismantled what remained of the Iraqi government. (In addition to this 
structural ‘failure’, this action also contributed to popular perception of 
‘failure’ discussed later in this section.) 
Security or Defense Failure 
The 1963 and 1968 coups represent observable security failures of the 
siting governments, and the inability of Iraq’s state security to maintain the 
integrity of its government and institutions. More concretely, 1991 saw Iraq 
fail militarily in the Gulf War, losing one-third of its military manpower and 
weakening the state security apparatus. The opposition, seeking to capitalize 
on the opportunity, encouraged the popular uprising to coincide with this 
security failure. State security services were unable to preempt the 
subsequent nationwide uprising, though it was quickly subdued.21 In this 
 
20 Micha Zenko, Remembering the Iraqi Uprising Twenty-Five Years Ago (Council on Foreign Relations, 
2016) 
21 Faleh Abd- al-Jabbar, “Why the Uprisings Failed”, Middle East Report, No 176, pp 2-14, 1992 
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conflict, the observable failure of state security directly encouraged and 
enabled the ensuing insurgency. 
The 2003 US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq represented the 
most overt failure of Iraq’s defense and security infrastructure in the 60 year 
scope of this paper. Within the first hours of the military operation, 
Saddam’s government was essentialy colapsed, and within weeks, its 
institutions (including the military) were formaly dissolved.22 
The coalition had intended to serve as an intermediate capability along 
with reintegrated remnants of Iraq’s security forces. However, those 
remaining security forces were il-equipped to counter rising crime rates and 
violence.23 This security vacuum likely emboldened the ensuing insurgency. 
Constituent-perceived Failure 
Iraqi public opinion data during the Hussein regime was likely never 
colected or was closely guarded by the state. In 1982, Hussein rejected a 
public referendum of support for his government, asserting that he was not 
like other leaders who “have no position of leadership except by this 
method.” His aim was likely to avoid measuring constituent’s support of the 
 
22 L. Paul Bremer, Coalition Provisional Authority Order 2 (CPA, 2003) 
23 Andrew Rathmel, Olga Oliker, Terrence Kely, David Brannan, Keith Crane, Developing Iraq’s Security 
Sector (RAND, 2005) 
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siting government, amid existing political divisions in the country and 
within Hussein’s own party.24 
Prior to the Gulf War, Hussein fostered a strong base of popular 
support rooted in patriotism and Iraqi nationalism. However, with Iraq’s 
defeat and forced withdrawal in 1991, unpopularity of Saddam’s 
government spiked. The subsequent uprising sought to capitalized on this 
military failure, weakened institutions, and public dissent. 25 
Starting in 1990, the Iraqi government was increasingly constrained  
by international sanctions. By the 2003 US-led invasion, government 
services including education, sanitation, and utilities operated at a severe 
deficit and contributed to the appearance of a government failing to provide 
its requisite services.26 
As to the observable failure of government folowing the 2003 
occupation, the formal dissolution of the Iraqi institutions left thousands of 
seasoned and now disenfranchised government workers without jobs. In this 
regard, the ‘new’ coalition-instaled government was likley already 
perceived as “failed” from the perception of those ejected from it. Many 
former public sector workers, specificaly those in security services, entered 
 
24 Ofra Bengio, Saddam’s World Oxford Press, 1998) 
25 Faleh Abd- al-Jabbar, “Why the Uprisings Failed”, Middle East Report, No 176, pp 2-14, 1992 
26 Hans-Christopf Von Sponeck, “Iraq: Burden of US Sanctions”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol 40, No 
47, pp.4902-4905, 2005 
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the subsequent insurgency, either as a means of income or for ideological 
fulfilment.  
Colombia - Preceded by Institutional Failure  
Government Transition, Interruption, or Colapse  
 Both of the most prominent insurgencies in modern-day Colombia, 
the National Liberation Army (ELN) and Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC), were formed in 1964 toward the end of the Colombian 
Civil War.27 During that conflict, known as “La Violencia”, government 
administrations transitioned at least 7 times, contributing to an era of 
governance disruption and instability.28 This volatility caused Colombia’s 
political culture to adapt, ultimately promoting political parties as substitutes 
for the dysfunctional central government.29 
Security or Defense Failure 
Throughout La Violencia, the Colombian government repeatedly 
proved unable to maintain domestic security and ensure the safety of its 
population. This period of conflict saw intense and widespread brutality 
largely unconstrained by the siting government, resulting in approximately 
 
27 Center for International Security and Cooperation, Mapping Militants (Stanford University, 2019) 
28 Norman Bailey, “La Violencia in Colombia”, Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol 9, No 4, pp. 561-575, 
1967 




200,000 dead.30 The warring political parties sought to capitalize on this 
violence by co-opting and fanaticizing Colombia’s peasant class, which 
grew increasingly reliant on this affiliation for the mutual security it 
provided.31 In this sense, the security vacuum left by state intuitions 
compeled the populace to join, support, and engage in the violence.  
Constituent-perceived Failure 
In the decades preceding the FARC and ELN insurgencies, the 
Colombian government suffered from insufficient resources, corruption, and 
infrequent or disproportionate opportunities for participation.32 The federal 
government proved unable to project authority and deliver services in more 
rural areas of the nation where insurgent groups established themselves. 33 
Specifically, the government was largely unable to provide policing, 
judiciary, education, and utility services in rural regions.34 Some of these 
communities were cut off from government infrastructure and services for 
 
30 RAND (Multiple Authors),“Counterinsurgency Transition Case Study: Colombia” in From Insurgency to 
Stability: Volume I: Insights from Selected Case Studies (RAND, 2011) 
31 Norman A. Bailey, “La Violencia in Colombia”, Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp 561-
575, 1967 
32 Karina Wong, Colombia: A Case Study in the Role of the Afected State in Humanitarian Action (Overseas 
Development Institute, 2008) 
33 Center for International Policy, A Compass for Colombia Policy (2008) 




tens of years, likely contributing to a popular perception of complacent or 
dysfunctional central government.35 
Sri Lanka – Not Preceded by Institutional or Government Failure  
Government Transition, Interruption, or Colapse  
Sri Lanka, previously Ceylon, gained independence from British rule 
in 1948, representing a reset of the nation’s government institutions.36 A 
functional democracy emerged, with robust institutions and a relatively 
solvent economy. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“The Tamil 
Tigers” or LTTE) formed and began its violent insurgency in 1976 amid this 
era of government success and stability, although many of its institutions 
were later degraded by decades of insurgency. 37 
Security or Defense Failure 
 In 1962, an atempted coup to overthrow the Sri Lankan government 
was preemptively disrupted by security services. In 1971, five years prior to 
the formation of LTTE, an organized and unprecedented uprising, the largest 
in Sri Lanka’s history to that point, was quickly aborted.38 Although the 
police and military were unprepared for an uprising of this scale, they 
 
35 Michael Igo, “The World Bank presidency and a peace agreement in Colombia: This week in 
development news” (DevEx, 2016) 
36 Jayshree Bajoria, The Sri Lankan Conflict (CFR, 2009) 
37 United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, A Beautiful Island – Its Bloody Past 
and Potential Future (UN) 
38 D.C.R.A. Goonetileke, “The 1971 Insurgency in Sri Lankan Literature in English” in MFS Modern Fiction 
Studies, Vol 39, No 1, Spring, pp 131-145, 1993 
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consolidated forces, integrated foreign support, and launched a successful 
counter-offensive, forcing the guerrilas to seek shelter in jungles and more 
inhospitable terrain. The uprising was unprepared to sustain operations in 
these environments, and colapsed.39 The government’s timely suppression 
of the 1971 uprising underscores its domestic security capability at the time.  
Constituent-perceived Failure 
 In the years preceding the formation of LTTE, the Tamil United 
Liberation Front (the main Tamil political party) used political avenues to 
express the grievances of the Tamil populace – mainly deficiencies in 
government services, education, and development. 40 However, according to 
the 1971 census (preceding the formation of LTTE in 1976), ethnic Tamils 
accounted for only 9.26% of Sri Lanka’s population.41 This demographic’s 
perception of government failings, in the absence of observable government 
instability or security failure, are too narrowly represented to be qualitatively 
significant or reliable for the purposes of this framework. Therefore, the 
perceptions and grievances of minority Tamils alone, absent sentiment 
represented in a wider population, cannot satisfy the “government or 
institutional failure” variable. 
 
39 G. Samaranayaka, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971-1987 (Gyana Publishing House, 2008) 
40 Central Inteligence Agency, Sri Lanka: The Growing Insurgency (CIA, 1986) 





Of the four case studies examined in this chapter, three– Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and Colombia – occurred amid some variant of institutional or 
government failure. These case studies satisfied al of the sub-variables – 
security or defense failure; transition, interruption, or colapse of the siting 
government, and constituent-perceived failure.  
As an outlier, Sri Lanka’s insurgency occurred amid a relatively stable 
and functional national government which did not experience a substantive 
security failure preceding the insurgency. There was a constituent perception 
of government failure present, however, as noted previously, this perception 
was present within too narrow a demographic of the larger population to be 
significant or reliable for the purpose of this framework. 
These results suggest a positive, though not definitive correlation 
between the variable “institutional or government failure” and the 
occurrence of future insurgency. The results of the Sri Lankan case study 




Afghanistan Iraq Colombia Sri Lanka 
Security or Defense Failure ✓ ✓ ✓ ✘ 
Transition/ Interruption/ Colapse ✓ ✓ ✓ ✘ 
Constituent-Perceived Failure ✓ ✓ ✓ ✘ 
Table 1: Tripwire 1 Results 
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necessary to incubate an insurgency. Specificaly, for the purpose of 
preempting future insurgencies, a determined constituency with perceptions 
of government failure may stil manifest insurgency, despite the lack of 
observable instability or security failure. The same or similar substitution, 
then, could be possible for any of the other variables discussed later in this 
portfolio.  
It is conceded other instances of insurgency not examined for this 
paper likely occurred within functional institutions or non-failed 
governments. Stil, with ¾ of the case studies upholding the variable, this 
chapter’s findings, in the context of the broader portfolio, appear valid: 












TRIPWIRE 2: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY OR DISRUPTION 
“May the voice of those below, those milions and milions of poor who 
have never counted, may they be listened to, may they decide their future.” 
 
 – Timoleon Jimenez (‘Timochenko’), Former FARC Supreme Leader 
 
Review of Literature 
The majority of research discussed below identifies economic factors 
as a key driver of insurgency. The colective research broadly highlights 3 
economic factors, (1) socio-economic disparity and inopportunity , (2) 
general national economic downturn, and (3) dependency on external or 
foreign sources of economic welfare. 
Fearon and Laitin argue that poverty is one of the three most reliable 
predictors of insurgency (in concert with large population and instability.) 
Their research finds that, on average, $1,000 less in per capita income yields 
a 41% greater likelihood of civil war, annualy. The research also holds that, 
even when examining only the poorest nations at the extreme end of the per 
capita income range, $1,000 less in income stil yields an average of 34% 
greater annual odds of insurgency. 42 
 
 




RAND researchers Christopher Paul, Colin Clarke, Beth Gril, and 
Moly Dunigan observe economic depravity or disparity as a driving 
contributor to the majority of 41 insurgency case studies they examined. 
Among those case studies, the authors find that economic downturn, 
regardless of previous financial strength of a nation, is a viable predictor of 
insurgency, as is an economy heavily reliant on external, foreign sources. 43 
US Army Special Operations Command asserts that political violence 
is more likely to occur in socio-economicaly deprived countries, and that 
overal economic development has proven to be a significant predictor of 
internal conflict. This study goes so far as to expand into sub-genres of 
economic influences: energy usage, income, infant mortality, and level of 
male secondary schooling.44 
 Prakarsh Singh of the Institute for the Study of Labor notes a similar 3 
economic variables are likely to lead to insurgency. First, lower per capita 
income or slow economic growth increase the atractiveness of violence as 
either a source of personal income or outlet for economic grievance. Second, 
mountainous terrain also proves a statistical predictor of insurgency, as 
inhospitable regions often lack economic development and opportunity due 
 
43 Colin Clarke, Christopher Paul, Beth Gril, Moly Dunigan, Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case 
Studies (RAND National Defense Research Institute 2013) 




to inhibited transportation and access. Third, lower education levels, also 
coexisting with economicaly repressed areas, contributes to the likelihood 
of insurgent violence. Singh observes that, statisticaly, economic drivers are 
a more reliable predictor of insurgency than grievance/ideological-based 
motivators. (The author caveats that this statistic may be due to difficulties 
in quantifying the other ideological or social variables.) 45 
On the theory of external dependence, Richard Stubbs of the Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies observes that, prior to the Malayan insurgency, 
World War II damaged the Malayan economy. This decline and slow 
rebound contributed to domestic unrest and, ultimately, insurgency. This 
example suggested that external catalysts for economic decline are just as 
viable predictors of insurgency as domestic causes, and that the indigenous 
government need not be the cause of the decline to foster unrest and 
insurgency.46 
Colier and Hoeffler substantiate the “economic greed” rebelion and 
civil wars theory – that some insurgencies are entirely motivated by financial 
greed, not ideological or political motive. Reinforcing the economic 
approach to rebelion, they observe that rebelion can generate profit, and the 
 
45 Prakarsh Singh. Evidence from the Punjab Insurgency. (Amherst Colege, 2016) 





decision to rebel can be seemingly driven by the pursuit or availability of 
profitable opportunities. 47 
Researchers Beenish Sultan and Marium Akhtar echo Colier and 
Hoeffler’s theory, that economic greed is the main driver of some 
insurgencies, and that conflict becomes an opportunity to achieve the 
economic status promised but not delivered by the broader institution or 
government. They expand on this theory, noting that insurgent groups have 
historicaly leveraged the economic divide in their country by coopting the 
subset of the population left vulnerable by economic deprivation. They 
point to the Taliban in Pakistan as having exploited this socio-economic 
divide in tribal areas.48 
Author and researcher Gretchen Peters also cites the predominately 
poor Afghan Taliban in his case study, portraying them as indigent men 
living off the alms of their “constituents” through taxation and donations. 
However, Taliban leadership (senior, provincial, district, and vilage-level) 
often enjoyed comparatively higher personal income than those in 
government service or private employment, an atractive recruiting and 
retention tool for the insurgency. The Taliban routinely poached Afghan 
 
47 Coler, Paul. Hoefler, Anke, Greed and Grievance in Civil War (Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford 
University, 2004) 
48 Marium Akhtar; Beenish Sultan, “Insurgencies in South Asia: A Comparative Case Study of India’s 
Maoists and Pakistani Taliban” (Margalla Papers 2015) 
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police and military members, particularly in rural districts, by offering beter 
pay and benefits for family members that could not be matched by the 
government.49 
 Journalist Tony Karon observes the same phenomenon in Ireland, 
Spain, Macedonia, and Palestine – that the insurgencies in these places offer 
more lucrative employment, particularly for young males, than other 
options. In Macedonia, rampant unemployment prior to the insurgency 
almost certainly drove young adults to join the insurgency. In Palestine, the 
offer of wages and financial incentives for the families of suicide bombers 
has proven an effective recruiting tool in areas with litle economic 
opportunity.50 
Some research consulted, however, suggests that economic factors are 
not predictors or drivers of insurgency, with some sources observing litle if 
any correlation between poverty and insurgency. These sources, as folow, 
also note that insurgency has occurred in economicaly-thriving regions, and 
likewise, has not occurred in economicaly-depressed or disparate ones.  
Professors Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova note that there is litle 
direct connection between poverty and the subset of insurgent violence.51 
 
49 Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror. (Thomas Dunne Books, 2009) 
50 Tony Karon, The Economics of Insurgency from Ireland to Israel. (TIME, 2001) 
51 Alan Krueger & Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There A Causal Connection?” 
(Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 17, Number 4, Fal 2003) 
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Stanford Professor Avidit Acharya echoes this sentiment, noting that GDP 
per worker does not have any significant effect on conflict.52 So, too, do 
Lieutenant Colonel John Malevich and professor Daryl Youngman, who 
observe the countless poverty-stricken countries not affected by insurgency, 
and who note that even those nations who have experienced insurgent 
violence have often experienced comparatively long stretches of peace.53 
The aforementioned US Army Special Operations Command material 
caveats that insurgencies are not solely derived from economic deprivation, 
explaining that deprivation here contributes to dissatisfaction in other more 
substantive social contributors to insurgency. 54 
 Finaly, Singh offers the Punjabi insurgency as an anomaly, in that, 
the insurgency did not occur in a poor or underdeveloped region, and did not 
suffer economic downturn prior to the insurgency. He also notes that 
economic effects were disproportionately borne by women and children, not 
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Case Study Results 
Afghanistan – Preceded by Economic Inequality and Disruption 
Socio-Economic Disparity & Inopportunity  
In 1974, the Afghan economy saw pockets of rapid development and 
prosperity. However, it also experienced wide disparity in economic status, 
driven by an increasingly divergent class system.56 The majority of the 
economy was grounded in informal agricultural or smal-scale self-
employed services.57 
Between 1975 and 1976, the typicaly lower socio-economic sectors 
of agriculture and handicrafts (household services) accounted for 67.8% and 
11.1% of nationwide employment, respectively. Compare this to only 3.9% 
employed in industry, and 5.6% in trade and commerce. The average 
proportion of the population faling below the poverty line averaged 30% 
nationwide, with fluctuations as high as 50% in some provinces. 58 
By 2000, the agriculture sector accounted for 79.2% of national 
employment. Poverty statistics remained consistent, hovering between 25-
30% of the national population below the poverty line, with localized 
 
56 Maxwel Fry, The Afghan Economy: Money, Finance, and the Critical Constrains to Economic 
Development (BRILL, 1974) 
57 Paul Fishtein, Murtaza Edries Amiryar, Afghan Economic Policy, Institutions, and Society Since 2001 (US 
Institute of Peace, 2015) 
58 I.Z. Bhaty, L. Berouti, “A Development Strategy for Afghanistan” in The Pakistan Development Review, 
Vol 19, No 4, pp 337-352, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1980. 
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spikes.59 Colectively, these metrics suggest a history of socio-economic 
disparity and poverty.  
National Economic Downturn 
World Bank data demonstrates economic turbidity since the 1960’s, 
with severe bearish trends from 1979 to 1990, and overal contraction 
through 2001. In 1994, Afghanistan was the poorest nation in the world, 
coinciding with the rise of the Taliban. That economic status remained 
unchanged through the Taliban’s tenure as a ruling body as wel as the 2001 
coalition invasion and subsequent insurgency. 60 This data suggests a 
gradual but consistent downturn in the national economy prior to 2001.  
External Economic Dependency 
In 1970, trade accounted for only 21.7% of the country’s GDP. 
Between 1970 and 2001, trade as a percent of national GDP rose from  
27.3% to 51.13%.61 This metric suggests a precipitous increase in 





59 The World Bank, “Databank” (The World Bank, accessed 2020) 
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Iraq - Preceded by Economic Inequality and Disruption 
Socio-Economic Disparity & Inopportunity  
Under the Saddam regime, Iraq’s economic data was protected as a 
state secret, so available data is of questionable reliability. 62 
Prior to the Gulf War, the oil sector accounted for more than 60% of 
the country’s GDP. The petroleum sector remained the largest sector of 
Iraq’s government, and one of the largest employers in the country, while 
also the most underemployed. 63 This contributed to a persistent 
unemployment crisis preceding its insurgency, with approximately 28 
percent of Iraq’s labor force unemployed in 2003.64 
 In 2003, approximately 55% of the population was estimated to fal 
below the poverty line. Additionaly, a 2003 survey found that roughly 60% 
of the population relied on government food rations to supplement their 
daily requirements.65 
National Economic Downturn 
Prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the oil industry is estimated to have 
accounted for 61 percent of the economy. Folowing the Gulf War and 
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subsequent sanctions, this sector of Iraq’s economy declined precipitously 
through 1996, yet accounted for up to 90% of government income and 80% 
of export revenue. 66 Reflecting this decline, the national GDP fel from a 
high of $179.9 bilion USD in 1997 to a low of $19 bilion USD in 2002.67 
External Economic Dependency 
In the years prior to 2003, Iraq’s state-owned petroleum sector was 
heavily reliant on export revenue as wel foreign equipment and technology. 
In short, the nation’s largest economic sector was heavily reliant on both 
external enablers and external consumers.68 Between 1996 and 2003, trade 
as a percentage of national GDP spiked from 0.027% to 154.235%, 
indicating an acute economic hyper dependence on foreign trade.69 
Colombia - Preceded by Economic Inequality and Disruption 
Socio-Economic Disparity & Inopportunity  
Generalized poverty and wide socio-economic inequality have 
plagued Colombia for decades. In the 1950s and 1960s, much of the nation’s 
employment and wealth was concentrated in high-income and skiled 
sectors, with an equaly wide inequality between urban and rural areas.70 
 
66 Central Inteligence Agency, “Iraq Economic Data” (CIA, 2004) 
67 The World Bank, “Databank” (The World Bank, accessed 2020) 
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This inequality peaked in the mid-late 1960’s, coinciding with the 
incorporation of the ELN and FARC.71 
National Economic Downturn 
The 1950s and 1960s saw a devaluation of the nation’s currency and a 
colapse of the economy’s prime export, coffee. 72 Heavily reliant on failing 
exports and restrained by poor infrastructure and narcotrafficking, urban 
unemployment in the late 1960s trended between 10-14%. 73 The national 
GDP remained suppressed during the 1960s, ranging between $4.0 and $6.0 
Bilion USD.74 
External Economic Dependency 
Trade as a percentage of Colombia’s national GDP fel from 30.6% in 
1960 to 24.6% in 1946.75 This metric suggests the Colombian economy was 
decreasingly reliant on foreign trade in the years preceding the formation of 
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Sri Lanka- Preceded by Economic Inequality and Disruption 
Socio-Economic Disparity & Inopportunity  
For a decade prior to the onset of the Tamil Tiger insurgency, poverty 
and socio-economic inequality in Sri Lanka was in decline. Per capita 
incomes were evenly distributed across ethnic groups and industrial sectors 
between 1963 and 1973, and the broader Sri Lankan government was 
experiencing a time of economic growth. 76 
However, between 1973 and 1979, immediately preempting the onset 
of the insurgency, these trends had reversed. Economic inequality, both 
ethnic and by industrial sector, widened, and poverty increased 
exponentialy. 77 
National Economic Downturn 
Also during this time frame, the whole of the economy inverted into a 
bearish trend. This is atributed to the injection of “trickle-down” strategies 
in the government’s economic development model.78 
Simultaneously, unemployment increased, with most job opportunities 
centered in government and the public sector. In fact, the public sector 
expanded over al other key sectors, including industry, agriculture, trade 
 





and exports, and banking.79 However, national GDP increased in the years 
preceding insurgency, from $2.87 bilion USD in 1973 to 3.59 bilion USD 
in 1976. 80 
External Economic Dependency 
 Between 1972 and 1976, trade as a percentage of Sri Lanka’s national 
GDP increased from 46.2% to 60.4%.81 This 30% increase suggests a 
growing dependence on foreign trade in the immediate years preceding the 
LTTE insurgency. However, trade as a component of the national economy 
was stil dwarfed by the public sector.  
Findings 
 
Overal, economic inequality and/or disruption appears a viable 
tripwire for predicting future insurgencies. The Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Colombian, and Sri Lankan insurgencies examined in this paper al occurred 
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Afghanistan Iraq Colombia Sri Lanka 
Socio-Economic Disparity & 
Inopportunity 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
National Economic Downturn ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
External Economic Dependency  ✓ ✓ ✘ ✘ 
Table 2: Tripwire 2 Results 
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within the context of varying degrees of economic decline or inequality. 
Specificaly, two of the four case studies satisfied al four components of 
economic tripwires: (1) the disparity between socio-economic classes, (2) 
general national economic downturn, and (3) the degree of dependency on 
externalized or foreign sources of economic welfare, and (4) lack of 
economic or employment opportunity.  
Colombia and Sri Lanka did not satisfy al four variables, as their 
economies were not dependent upon foreign sources or exports at the onset 
of insurgency. The result of these case studies suggest that 100% fulfilment 
of these environmental features may not be necessary to create an economic 
situation that may incubate insurgency. Specificaly, for the purpose of 
preempting future insurgencies, socio-economic disparity, general economic 
downturn, and unemployment may prove more reliable predictors, al of 
which were satisfied in the Colombian and Sri Lanka case studies. 
This finding is consistent with the preponderance of literature on the 
subject of insurgency (predictors, drivers, enablers, etc.) consulted for in this 
research, which suggested, as a whole, economic factors predicted, enabled, 
and drove insurgency. This research did not support the competing body of 
literature which suggests litle or no correlation between national economic 
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circumstances and insurgency. To the contrary, every case study consulted 
presented varied degrees of economic inequality or disruption.  
It is conceded that some instances of insurgency not examined likely 
occurred within economicaly equitable and stable nations. Stil, this paper’s 
findings, in the context of the broader portfolio, appear valid: economic 

















TRIPWIRE 3: MARGINALIZED OR PERSECUTED IDEOLOGY 
 
“If you look at Islamic countries, the people are in despair. They are complaining that 
Islam is gone. But people remain firm in their Islamic beliefs. In their pain and 
frustration, some of them commit suicide acts. They feel they have nothing to lose.” 
 
– Mulah Omar, Taliban Founder 
 
Review of Literature 
Research is divided on the influences of religion and ideology, both as 
stand-alone drivers or when underrepresented or persecuted. Equaly 
compeling literature on both sides of the argument held that either: ideology 
and/or persecution of that ideology was a primary, if not indispensable 
driver of insurgency; or that ideology (particularly extreme or hyper-
exclusive ideology) negatively impacted by insurgency via exclusionary and 
unrealistic practices.  
The literature that affirms the role of ideology in fermenting 
insurgency generaly lends itself to three sub-variables: 1) marginalization, 
2) persecution, and 3) political domination.  
For a baseline on the role of marginalization and persecution, 
Horowitz, predicts that those nations that have both a significant ethnic 
majority and grossly disadvantaged or underrepresented minority are at 
greater risk for internal violent conflict. Horowitz specificaly uses the 
majority group’s domination in political contests or election as a metric for 
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gauging the necessary disparity for his hypothesis. 82 This finding on 
“ethnic” disparity can be included in the discussion of the broader 
“ideological” disparity referenced in this chapter.  
Sultan and Akhtar list ideological grievance as one of the most 
frequent causes of insurgency, Islamic and communist insurgencies at the 
forefront. They also note that the more ideologicaly divided a country or 
community, the more likely an insurgency is to occur.83 
The US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual cites ideology as a 
core organizer and driver of insurgency. It notes that the strongest insurgent 
ideologies reinforce overtones of injustice and suppression, pointing to Al 
Qaeda’s rhetoric of systemic Islamic repression when promoting the 
organization’s goal of reestablishing the Islamic Caliphate.84 According to 
Malevich and Youngman, ideology and culture, not economics, should be 
regarded as the root cause of insurgency.85 
 However, Acharya observes litle correlation between ideology and 
the onset or intensity of conflict. She found only a weak statistical 
correlation between ideology and intensity of insurgent conflict in her 
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85 John Makevich & Daryl Youngman, “The Afghan Balance of Power and the Culture of Jihad” (Military 
Review, May-June 2011) 
  
 41 
analysis of Nepal’s insurgency. She found no evidence of a link between the 
intensity of ideological grievance and the frequency of violence.86 
Paul, Clarke, Gril, and Dunigan’s case studies went so far as to 
support the assertion that strong ideology is negatively correlated with 
insurgency, in that, strong ideologicaly-driven insurgencies tend to be 
exclusive and discourage broad participation or buy-in. (Insurgencies, 
without popular support, are at a severe disadvantage.) Many of these case 
studies listed departure from staunch ideology and adopted flexibility as a 
reason for the increased longevity of insurgencies.87 The US State 
Department notes that, even though an ideology may organize or motivate a 
core base of insurgents, ideology wil “not necessarily extend across the 
whole insurgent network.”88 This also makes the case for the importance of 
ideological flexibility, particularly on maters of recruiting, retention, and 
internal affairs. 
 US Army Special Operations Command holds ideology as a 
“necessary although not sufficient” element of insurgencies. It observes that 
ideology provides a “common ground” for members of an insurgency, and 
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often justifies insurgent violence. It also notes the positive impact of 
ideology on recruitment and retention, as ideology both draws recruits to an 
insurgency, and reinforces their long term commitment to the movement. 
The same study argues that the strongest and “most immediate” risk factor 
for radicalization and potential insurgency is the marginalization or 
persecution of ideology, via government repression, political discrimination, 
or economic subjugation.89 So then, ideology may only be a preeminent 
driver of insurgency when an institution seeks to suppress or persecute it. 
 
Case Study Results 
Afghanistan – Preceded by Marginalized, Persecuted Ideology and 
Political Domination  
 Marginalization & Persecution  
Islamism, the ideological force behind the Mujahedeen and Taliban, 
directly contradicted most tenants of Afghan leader Muhammad Daoud’s 
vision of Afghanistan’s culture and tradition. It’s rise in the 1970’s 
represented the ascendance of an ideology actively repressed by the Daoud-
era Afghan government. Daoud’s presidency ideologicaly polarized 
 




Afghanistan, and emboldened Islamists, who would atempt several forceful 
overthrows of his administration. In 1973, Daoud’s government ordered the 
targeting and arrest of members of Afghanistan’s Islamist party, forcing 
them to flee the country en masse.90 
Folowing the Daoud era of repression and subsequent Soviet invasion 
and withdraw from Afghanistan, this Islamist ideology would morph into the 
Taliban.91 The movement’s ideological framework caled for renewed 
enforcement of the shari’a and rejuvenation of the long-repressed “Islamic 
character” of Afghanistan.92 
Political Domination 
Amid the Islamist repression of the Daoud administration, the Islamist 
political party, the Muslim Youth Organization (MYO) had litle influence 
over public policy. Daoud actively repressed competing political 
movements, effectively turning Afghanistan into a single-party state. The 
MYO was motivated to violence by this lack of political power and the 
siting government’s active persecution of Islamist ideology.93 
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Iraq – Preceded by Marginalized, Persecuted Ideology & Political 
Domination 
 Marginalization & Persecution 
After the Coalition overthrow of Saddam’s regime, the Iraqi military 
and security apparatus remained intact, inundated with Baathist loyalists—
wel trained, armed, and fervently loyal ideologues responsible for the 
country’s record of human rights atrocities. The Baath party had terrorized 
the Iraqi people for decades, and its doctrine was decidedly incompatible 
with the elements of democracy the US would later instal. It could not play 
a role in the new Iraqi government, and was dissolved.  
In a sweeping bout of de-Baathification, the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) began deconstructing Saddam’s government. Over several 
months, compounding CPA orders dismantled entire sectors of Iraq’s public 
services. Ultimately, an estimated 100,000 Sunni Baathists representing al 
facets of government would be indiscriminately and unceremoniously fired.  
After several years of perceived Sunni marginalization, droves of 
former security officials gravitated to Iraq’s al-Qaeda affiliate, contributing 
tactical expertise and military-grade equipment to the insurgency. They 





In a 2002 referendum, Saddam Hussein, and the Baath party by 
extension, won a remarkable but infeasible 100% vote of approval by the 
Iraqi populace, which was likely compeled by fear of political retaliation.94 
This was one of the final codified examples of the Baath party’s domination 
of Iraqi political channels prior to the onset of insurgency.  
Colombia – Preceded by Marginalized and Persecuted Ideology  
Marginalization & Persecution 
In the decades prior to the formation of the FARC and ELN, the 
Colombian armed forces actively repressed liberalism and non-conservative 
movements in the country. Violence was prevalent. Fervent liberal and 
conservative groups clashed while those holding opposing views to the 
government’s model of conservative thought were subject to violence or 
extrajudicial kiling by the military. Ultimately, this ruthless suppression 
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 Despite government persecution, the liberals preserved appearances of 
even representation within government. The Liberal Party maintained a 
majority of seats in Colombia’s Congress during the 1960s and 1970s.96 
Sri Lanka – Preceded by Marginalized Ideology & Political Domination  
 Marginalization 
Folowing independence, the ethnic minority Sinhalese began a 
concerted campaign to marginalize the Timil minority. A 1956 law 
prohibited Tamils from seeking government employment or public 
education and made Sinhala the official national language. 97 This law 
effectively granted control of government and the political process to the 
ethnic Sinhalese, denying the Tamil a voice in society.98 In an era of 
marginalization, these measures specificaly gave rise to ethnic tension and, 
ultimately, the Tamil Tiger insurgency.  
 Political Domination 
 The Sinhala dominated government and actively sought to minimize 
Tamil representation in Sri Lankan politics. The siting government passed 
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legislation which prevented Tamils from participating in some elections and 
in some instances legaly dissolved their citizenship. In 1972, a new national 
constitution declared Sri Lanka a unitary state, formaly centralized political 
powers at the national level, and reacquired authority previously delegated to 




Overal, ideological underrepresentation and/or persecution has 
proven a reliable and repeatable insurgency tripwire within the examined 
case studies. The insurgencies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Colombia, and Sri 
Lanka of the last 60 years al developed amid acute or long-term ideological 
repression or persecution. 
These case studies suggest that the marginalization, subjugation, or 
oppression of ideology appears to have a reliably positive impact on the 
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Afghanistan Iraq Colombia Sri Lanka 
Marginalization ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Persecution ✓ ✓ ✓ ✘ 
Political Domination   ✓ ✓ ✘ ✓ 
Table 3 Tripwire 3 Results 
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likelihood of insurgency formation. This is a more conclusive and 
predictable finding than was suggested by the literature, which was divided 
on the role and usefulness of ideology in insurgencies and posited the ful 
range from beneficial and positive to obstructive and negative correlations. 
It is caveated that some instances of insurgency not examined for this 
portfolio likely occurred amid negligible or no ideological repression or 
persecution. However, this chapter’s findings, in the context of the broader 
portfolio, appear valid: ideological marginalization or persecution appears a 


























TRIPWIRE 4: NON-PERMISSIVE TERRAIN  
OR POROUS BORDERS 
 
“We have our friends and fighters…they are in the jungle…we can continue the fighting 
years and years; it’s not that dificult.”  
 
– Selvarasa Pathmanathan, LTTE Leader 
 
Review of Literature  
Colectively, the literature held that geography, terrain, and borders 
played an integral part in enabling insurgencies. Specificaly, the literature 
points to 1) nonpermissive or inhospitable terrain and 2) porous national 
borders. 
Clausewitz seminaly notes that in military conflict, terrain offers the 
advantages of obstructing an enemy’s approach and proving cover and 
concealment for friendly forces, both defensively and offensively.100 
According to the US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 
geography contributes to both the likelihood and viability of an insurgency. 
The manual notes that border areas contiguous to other nations increase the 
likelihood of foreign support and sustenance to the insurgency.101 
Afghanistan and Pakistan’s insurgencies serve as glaring case studies for this 
argument, as noted by Sultan and Akhtar. 102 
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Specific to terrain, Acharya argues that less hospitable areas are more 
conducive to insurgency because the terrain limits the projection of 
government authority and counterinsurgency response. She notes that, in the 
Nepal case study, insurgents would have been far less resilient if they did 
not have the benefit of forests and rugged terrain to aid their evasion of 
counterinsurgency forces. She also asserts that terrain less cross-sectioned 
by vehicle roadways is more ripe and statisticaly more likely to generate 
insurgency for the same reason. Finaly, she hypothesizes that inhospitable 
terrain positively impacts an insurgency’s recruiting and retention, and 
therefore longevity and intensity, as lack of government security projection 
compels rural residents to join the insurgency for personal safety.103 The US 
State Department echoes this, noting that insurgents respond to government 
counterinsurgency campaigns by withdrawing to inaccessible terrain, further 
protracting the conflict.104 
US Army Special Operations Command notes that mountainous 
terrain and dense forest offer similar benefits of concealment and evasion to 
insurgents, noting that nations have gone so far as to deforest areas to flush 
out combatants. But this study also notes that a number of successful 
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insurgencies survived without particular geographic advantages, particularly 
urban insurgencies. Here, though, the human terrain (the ability of insurgents 
to blend in with the indigenous non-combatant populace) can itself be 
regarded as an advantageous terrain feature. 105 
Case Study Results 
Afghanistan – Non-Permissive Terrain and Porous Borders  
 Non-Permissive Terrain 
The Mujahideen formed in the primarily rural, mountainous terrain of 
Parwan province, while the Taliban formed in the arid Kandahar province 
bordering Pakistan.106 The relatively inhospitable and inaccessible terrain in 
these areas limited the central government’s projection of authority, services, 
and security forces into rural areas. The lack of infrastructure and 
transportation in these areas made them more permissive for insurgent 
operations. 
Porous Borders  
The nation’s porous borders have enabled the ebb and flow of militant 
groups for decades. Iran’s border to the west and Pakistan’s border to the 
east have permited the strategic withdrawal of insurgents, and the injection 
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of foreign fighter recruits. Quantifiably, proximity of coalition forces to the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border has statisticaly increased the number coalition 
fatalities.107 
Iraq – Non-Permissive Terrain and Porous Borders 
Non-Permissive Terrain 
Iraq’s terrain has proven a key enabler for the insurgency since its 
infancy. The country’s terrain shifts from mountainous in the northeast 
region to desert in the central and southwest regions. The insurgency took 
advantage of both urban and rural areas. Urban environments including 
Baghdad and Mosul presented their own advantages, while rural epicenters 
of the insurgency were typicaly inhospitable and difficult to access.108 
Porous Borders  
The porous border between Iraq and Syria alowed both an influx of 
foreign fighters post-2003, and the strategic withdrawal of ISIS forces in 
2017. Without an injection of foreign fighters to counter the coalition 
occupation, the Iraq insurgency would almost certainly have existed for a 
shorter time and with less intensity. Likewise, ISIS would have likely 
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suffered significant losses after the fal of Mosul had they not had the option 
of strategic retreat across the border to preserve manpower.109 
Colombia – Non-Permissive Terrain and Porous Borders  
Non-Permissive Terrain 
Insurgent groups have taken advantage of other rural, inaccessible 
areas, specificaly in the southern and eastern regions of the country. Their 
predominance in these areas is in part a result of an ideology more heavily 
represented among rural Colombians, but has equaly served as a security 
buffer: The terrain and lack of infrastructure has provided these groups safe 
haven and chalenged government security forces’ ability to project 
oversight or conduct operations. 110 
Porous Borders  
The border region between Venezuela and Colombia has served as a 
hotbed of insurgency for decades. The region spans more than 2,000 
kilometers of rugged terrain. FARC and the ELN have benefited from 
external state sponsorship from neighboring Venezuela. Both group’s ability 
to stage within Venezuela and transit the border has significantly enabled 
 
109 Hassan Hassan, Insurgents Again: The Islamic State’s Calculated Reversion to Atrition in the Syria-Iraq 
Border Region and Beyond (Combating Terrorism Center, 2017) 




their longevity and operational effectiveness.111 Insurgent groups have also 
benefited from incursions into Peru, Ecuador, and Panama.112 
Sri Lanka – Non-Permissive Terrain and Porous Borders  
Non-Permissive Terrain 
Sri Lanka’s geography and terrain features heavily enabled the Tamil 
insurgency there. An island cross-sectioned by the Indian Ocean in the north, 
the Tamil’s northern stronghold Jaffna was isolated, only accessible by sea 
or narrow land bridges that routinely devolved into a choke point for 
security forces. Dense forests and mountain regions throughout the island 
harbored the insurgency and provided a base from which to launch urban 
operations. Thick canopy and vegetation precluded overhead surveilance 
and chalenged conventional security forces reliant on vehicle-borne combat 
and troop movement capabilities.  
Porous Borders  
Given the island’s smal size, Tamil-controled territories lacked an 
adequate buffer from government-controled areas and security forces, often 
leaving inadequate terrain for tactical retreats or flanking operations. 
Utilizing the accessible coastal borders of the island, the insurgency adapted, 
 
111 “Colombia’s New President Cals of Talks with a Leftist Insurgent Group” (Economist, 2018) 
112 Jeremy McDermot, “Colombia’s Conflict Spils Over” (BBC, 2002) 
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developing a crude naval force and using it to traffic weapons, gather 
inteligence, and conduct naval combat operations. The Tamil Navy became 
a deciding capability in the longevity of the insurgency, permited only by 
the island’s accessible and unsecured coastal borders.113  
Findings 
 
Both the literature and case study data reflected that geography, 
terrain, and national borders proved to be a highly reliable enabler of 
insurgencies. Al four of the insurgencies examined in this portfolio occurred 
within what proved to be non-permissive geography or terrain and/or near 
advantageous national borders. That is, that chalenging or inhospitable 
terrain and/or porous national borders, particularly those shared by harboring 
or supportive neighbors, not only enable insurgencies, but appear to drive 
them. 
 Given that the literature suggests that geography is more an enabler 
than an instigator of insurgencies, it is included in the prescribed framework 
 





Afghanistan Iraq Colombia Sri Lanka 
Nonpermissive Terrain ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Porous Borders ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Table 4: Tripwire 4 Results 
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as a supplemental tripwire, intended to be used when the previous 3 
tripwires produce suggestive but not compeling findings. In that case, this 
tripwire may be added to (not substituted for) the previous 3 when 








































Afghanistan Iraq Colombia Sri Lanka 
Tripwire 1: Institutional or 
Government Failure 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✘ 
Tripwire 2: Economic Inequality 
or Disruption 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Tripwire 3: Marginalized or 
Persecuted Ideology  
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Tripwire 4: Non-permissive 
Terrain or Porous Borders  
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Table 5: Overview of Case Study Findings 
 
Findings 
 While distant, localized insurgencies seemingly pose litle strategic 
risk to the United States, history has shown these conflicts have a tendency 
to project beyond their borders and necessitate global involvement. 
Insurgency has cost the United States greatly, in terms of money, lives, and 
time. This portfolio aimed to identify insurgency tripwires and test their 
reliability and repeatability against insurgencies in Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Colombia, and Sri Lanka. This, so that decisionmakers can beter preempt 
and potentialy mitigate against these costly fights in the future. 
The first tripwire, Institutional or Government Failure, was widely 
cited in the literature as both an enabler and a precipitator of insurgencies 
throughout history. Compared against the aforementioned four case studies, 
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three of them – Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia – occurred amid some 
variant of institutional or government failure.  
Sri Lanka’s insurgency occurred amid a relatively stable and 
functional national government. However, the segment of the population that 
would later devolve into the insurgent force did not appear to benefit from 
the government’s stability or services afforded to the rest of the population. 
In other words, the insurgents perceived a dysfunctional, failed government. 
It could then be argued that the government was “failed” (albeit a mater of 
perspective) but this case study was considered inconclusive in order to 
maintain the integrity of the paper. 
Stil, with 3-out-of-4 case studies upholding the hypothesis, this 
portfolio found that Institutional or Government Failure is a reliable tripwire 
for predicting insurgencies. The results of the Sri Lankan case study suggest 
that 100% fulfilment of these tripwires is not necessary to incubate an 
insurgency, as one stil occurred. Additionaly, there are almost certainly 
additional examples of insurgency which occurred despite functional 
institutions or non-failed governments. Both of these points underscore the 
discretion required in applying these tripwires in the real-world. That said, 
this tripwire proved practicable.  
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The second tripwire, Economic Inequality or Disruption, has long 
been pointed to as a cause for civil rebelion. The majority of literature 
reviewed in for this paper hypothesized that economic factors, including 
inequality or disruption, both enabled, and prolonged past insurgencies. 
The case studies review upheld this hypothesis: 4-out-of-4 of the case 
studies (Afghanistan, Iraq, Colombian, and Sri Lankan insurgencies) 
examined in this paper al occurred within the context of varying degrees of 
economic decline or inequality. In this regard, Economic Inequality or 
Disruption was assessed to be another reliable predictor of future 
insurgencies. As with the prior tripwire, it is conceded that some instances of 
insurgency not examined in this research likely occurred within 
economicaly equitable and stable nations. Stil, this finding, in the context 
of and for the purposes of the broader portfolio, appear valid. 
The third tripwire, Marginalized or Persecuted Ideology, has been an 
obvious driver of insurgencies throughout history. However, the literature 
reviewed for this paper was surprisingly split on the impact of ideology on 
insurgencies. Some sources echoed the expected finding, that repressed 
ideology was a necessary component to the formation and sustenance of an 
insurgency. However, some sources argued that ideology can have an 
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equaly detrimental impact on the formation and longevity of a movement, 
as fervent beliefs often cause interpersonal and institutional friction.  
The case studies provided a far more consistent and conclusive 
finding than did the literature: 4-out-of-4 of the insurgency case studies 
reviewed occurred amid acute or long-term ideological marginalization, 
persecution, or political domination. These case studies suggest that the 
marginalization, subjugation, or oppression of ideology appears to have a 
reliably positive impact on the likelihood of insurgency formation. As with 
the previous tripwires, it is stipulated that some instances of insurgency have 
likely occurred amid negligible or no ideological repression or persecution. 
However, in concert with the other tripwires proposed, this is likely a 
reliable and repeatable finding. 
4-out-of-4 of the case studies occurred with the benefits of non-
permissive terrain and/or porous national borders. However, this tripwire is 
heavily caveated. It is unlikely that an insurgency would arise solely because 
a group of people live or move within difficult terrain, or find themselves 
adjacent to a unsecure border. Instead, these geographic features are 
included as “supplemental” in the framework, and are intended for 
consideration specificaly when decisionmakers are unconvinced of findings 
based on the previous three tripwires. In that scenario, a group operating 
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within non-permissive terrain or near porous national borders may tip the 
scale toward a likely or imminent insurgency.  
Applications 
As stated in the Introduction, the purpose of this portfolio was to 
propose and test a useful and actionable framework for analysts and 
decision-makers. However, upon review, the analytic community is a far 
more likely consumer of this framework, as the information gatekeepers for 
senior leaders. Although the insurgency analysis portfolio is shared among 
dozens of federal entities, the obvious key stakeholders – the Department of 
Defense, Department of State, and the Central Inteligence Agency – are the 
day-to-day arbiters of insurgency monitoring and analysis. 
These tripwires, incorporated into these key stakeholders’ existing 
strategic analysis framework, could help analysts detect emerging 
insurgencies amid the firehose of daily global inteligence. This early 
warning, in turn, enables notification to senior leaders and decision-makers 
who then have the luxury of monitoring the situation, planning for 
continencies, and establishing “red lines” that would require US 
intervention. 
The proposed tripwires span multiple pilars of the strategic analysis 
enterprise. Applying this framework would require an amount of 
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synchronization among the various analytical disciplines housed within each 
of the stakeholder agencies. For instance, the Institutional or Government 
Failure tripwire would likely be the responsibility of political and 
governance analysts, those whose job it is to maintain a thorough 
understanding of the disposition of a given region or country’s domestic 
politics and leadership. The Economic Inequality or Disruption tripwire 
would be maintained by economic analysts, who track both global and 
localized economic trends. The Marginalized or Persecuted Ideology 
tripwire is likely best shared between political analysts, who monitor such 
sentiments in domestic political discourse, and human terrain analysts, who 
track ground-level social and cultural atmospherics. Finaly, the Non-
Permissive Terrain or Porous Borders supplemental tripwire is likely the 
work of both geospatial and government analysts. 
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 As demonstrated by the decision matrix above, each analytic team 
maintains their respective tripwires via routine analysis. If a tripwire is 
triggered, the responsible team coordinates across the enterprise with the 
holders of the other two tripwires. As additional tripwires are triggered, the 
corresponding body of evidence builds an increasingly confident assessment 
that insurgency is likely. If rising to this threshold, analysts wil brief the 
“high-confidence” assessment to mid-level leadership for consideration and 
ultimate elevation to decision-makers.  





























Low Confidence  High Confidence  
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However, if al three tripwires are “sprung” and assessments remain 
“low confidence”, the supplemental (fourth) tripwire may be included for 
analytical consideration. That supplemental tripwire may build enough 
confidence in assessments to warrant elevation to leadership. Alternately, the 
assessment wil remain uncompeling even with the addition of the 
supplemental tripwire, in which case the assessment is deemed low-
confidence and the monitoring process continues.  
Clearly, this framework is not intended as a rigid, “black-and-white” 
solution to predicting insurgency. Indeed, there are examples of nations 
which have fulfiled these variables but did not experience insurgency. In 
forecasting such an il-defined conflict, the analytic process must 
acknowledge and embrace the proverbial “gray area” inherent to this type of 
fight. Though not absolute, these tripwires are indicative of a degree of 
volatility and vulnerability to insurgency.  
It is not a perfect science — there have been and wil continue to be 
insurgencies driven by unforeseeable, localized variables. The most realistic 
expectation is for a broad but widely applicable framework that identifies the 
majority of these conflicts before they begin. Hopefuly, this framework wil 




The body of research consulted for this portfolio failed to address a 
seemingly obvious variable in predicting insurgency: cultural predisposition 
to violent conflict resolution.  
As an example, some tenants or interpretations of Afghan Pashtun 
culture appear to sanction violent dispute resolution. With limited to no 
central government judicial authority present in Afghanistan’s rural 
communities, approximately 80% of al disputes were setled through 
informal dispute resolution frameworks.114 These dispute resolution systems 
are guided by the ethical framework of Pashtunwali (“the way of the 
Pashtuns”). One of the four pilars of this ethical code is badal (revenge) and 
folows the “eye for an eye” theory of justice. This perpetuates a cycle of 
violence that can span generations.115This cultural proclivity toward violence 
may have enabled and encouraged the insurgency. 
Further quantitative research is needed to weigh pre-existing cultural 
violence with the manifestation of insurgency. For the purposes of this 
paper, cultural proclivities to violence were omited as variables, and would 
 
114 Toomey, Leigh. Thier, J Alexander, Bridging Modernity and Tradition: Rule of Law and Search for Justice 
in Afghanistan, US Institute of Peace, 2007) 
115 Pfeifer, Julia. “Traditional Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Afghanistan and their Relationship to the 
National Justice Sector” (Law and Politics in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, Vol. 44, No 1. 2011) 
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need to be researched and discussed separately from the other cultural or 
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